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interpretation by stating that Section 541(a)(1) “is not intended to expand the debtor’s rights 
against others more than they exist at the commencement of the case.”6  
 Although all circuits agree that in pari delicto is a part of a debtor’s estate under Section 
541(a), only a majority of the circuits have held that in pari delicto is an affirmative defense.7 In 
contrast, the Second Circuit has concluded that it is an issue of a trustee’s standing.8 This 
memorandum explores the contours of these two views in order to determine when trustees may 
avoid being held in pari delicto. Part I analyzes the elements that establish the affirmative 
defense of in pari delicto. Part II examines the exceptions a trustee may argue in order to defeat a 
proper claim of the defense. Part III explains the Second Circuit’s minority rule that in pari 
delicto is an issue of the trustee’s standing rather than an affirmative defense.  
I. Establishing the In Pari Delicto Defense 
A. In Pari Delicto is an Affirmative Defense 
The majority rule among circuit courts is that in pari delicto is an affirmative defense that 
precludes recovery from a plaintiff’s participation in wrongdoing with the defendant.9 To 
affirmatively raise this defense, the facts used to support in pari delicto must be “ascertainable 
from the complaint and other allowable sources of information, and … suffice to establish the 
affirmative defense with certitude.”10 
B. The Elements of the In Pari Delicto Defense  
                                               
6 H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 367-68 (1977). 
7 See Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 153 (1st Cir. 2006). 
8 See Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1991). 
9 Nisselson, at 153; Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 354–60 (3d Cir. 
2001); In re Derivium Capital LLC, 716 F.3d 355, 367 (4th Cir. 2013); Gray v. Evercore Restructuring, LLC, 544 
F.3d 320, 324–25 (5th Cir. 2008); Terlecky v. Hurd (In re Dublin Sec., Inc.), 133 F.3d 377, 380 (6th Cir. 1997); 
Grassmueck v. Am. Shorthorn Ass'n, 402 F.3d 833, 836–37 (8th Cir. 2005); Sender v. Buchanan (In re Hedged-Invs. 
Assocs., Inc.), 84 F.3d 1281, 1284–86 (10th Cir. 1996); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. 
Edwards, 437 F.3d at 1149–56. 
10 In re Rollaguard Sec., LLC, 570 B.R. 859, 883 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2017). 
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 The in pari delicto defense is broadly applied “to bar actions where plaintiffs have been 
involved ‘in the same sort of wrongdoing’ as defendants.”11  In order to properly raise this 
affirmative defense, a defendant must establish that: (1) the debtor bears equal responsibility for 
the violations the trustee seeks to redress; (2) the debtor participated in the wrongful conduct; 
and (3) the debtor’s wrongdoing must be generally of the type asserted against the defendant.12  
For example, in In re Mortgage Fund, the sole owner of Mortgage Fund ’08 (the 
“Debtor”) engaged in a fraudulent transfer scheme with R.E. Loans.13 This scheme substantially 
depleted all of the Debtor’s assets in breach of the owner’s fiduciary duty to the Debtor.14 Wells 
Fargo, with knowledge of this breach, approved these transfers because it financially benefitted 
from them.15 The United States District Court for the Northern District of California held that 
trustees who file claims on behalf of the bankruptcy estate do not hold rights greater than those 
that were held by the debtor.16 Consequently, such trustees are subject to the in pari delicto 
defense.17 Because the pleadings established that the actions of the Debtor’s owner were “at least 
as blameworthy as” Wells Fargo in perpetrating fraud, his conduct was imputed to the Debtor 
and to the trustee.18  Therefore, the in pari delicto defense barred the trustee’s claim.19  
In contrast, In re Bogdan, the Fourth Circuit concluded that in pari delicto did not bar the 
claims of a Chapter 7 trustee. After Bogdan and his corporation (collectively, “Bogdan”) filed for 
bankruptcy, mortgage lenders unconditionally assigned their fraud and conspiracy claims against 
Bogdan to the trustee of Bogdan’s estate.20 After concluding that these assignments were 
                                               
11 Bateman, at 307. 
12 Id.; In re Brobeck, No. 03-21784, 2008 WL 5650052, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Nov. 6, 2008). 
13 In re Mortg. Fund '08 LLC, 527 B.R. 351, 355 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 367. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 369. 
19 Id. at 370. 
20 In re Bogdan, 414 F.3d 507, 509 (4th Cir. 2005). 
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“property of the estate” under Section 541(a), the court found that the trustee stood “in the shoes 
of the mortgage lenders,” rather than Bogdan.21 Because the mortgage lenders were not involved 
in any of the alleged wrongdoing, the in pari delicto defense did not apply.22   
II. Exceptions to In Pari Delicto  
A. The “Adverse Interest” Exception  
The “adverse interest” exception to in pari delicto states that an agent’s wrongdoing will 
not be imputed to a debtor-principal where the wrongdoing agent acted for its own interests to 
the detriment of the debtor-principal.23 As such, a trustee may avoid the in pari delicto defense 
where it can establish that the defendant acted fraudulently against the debtor’s interests.24 For 
example, in R.F. Lafferty, the Third Circuit held that the defendant-agent’s Ponzi scheme was 
adverse to the interests of the debtor because its led to the deepening of the debtor’s 
insolvency.25  
B. The “Sole Actor” Exception to “Adverse Interest” 
The adverse interest exception is subject to the “sole actor” exception.26 This 
qualification provides that “‘where the principal and agent are one and the same,’ the agent's 
knowledge is imputed to the principal despite the fact that the agent is acting adversely to the 
principal.”27 An agent or agents are “one and the same” with the principle when they have 
sufficient decision making control over the principle.28  
                                               
21 Id. at 514. 
22 Id. 
23 R.F. Lafferty & Co., at 359. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Grassmueck, at 837. 
27 Id. at 838. 
28 Id.; See In re Yellow Cab Coop., Inc., 602 B.R. 357, 362 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2019) (applying the sole actor 
exception to officers and directors of a debtor-corporation who conspired with the defendant to defraud the debtor-
corporation of its valuable assets).  
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In Grassmeuck, the investment partnerships of debtor Hoyt Entities (collectively, “Hoyt”) 
were found to be one and the same with Hoyt because they were indistinguishable from each 
other.29 Specifically, Hoyt “assum[ed] the role of principal as well as agent” when it became a 
general partner of the investment partnerships.30 Additionally, Hoyt singularly dominated the 
decisions of the partnerships because it acted on the behalf of the investor partners.31 
Consequently, the partnerships “existed in form only and were indistinguishable from Hoyt.”32 
Therefore, the Eighth Circuit held that the sole actor rule applied and that doctrine of in pari 




C. The Sixth Circuit’s Innocent-Insider Exception to the Sole Actor Rule 
The Sixth Circuit has recognized a corollary to the “sole actor” exception called the 
“innocent decision-maker” exception.34 Where an agent that has the power to stop wrongdoing 
against its debtor-principal, “‘the culpable agents who had totally abandoned the interests of the 
principal, and were thus acting outside the scope of their agency, [are] not identical to the 
                                               
29 Id. at 837. 




34 In re Fair Fin. Co., 834 F.3d 651, 679 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that the Ohio Supreme Court would apply the 
innocent decision-maker exception because it “flows ineluctably from the agency principles that underlie the sole 
actor doctrine.”). 
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principal.’”35 Therefore, a defendant would not be able to assert the sole actor exception and the 
trustee may use the adverse interest rule to avoid the in pari delicto defense.36  
III. The Second Circuit’s Approach: In Pari Delicto is a Standing Issue  
A. The Wagoner Rule 
In Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, the Second Circuit distinguished itself 
from other circuit courts when it held that the in pari delicto doctrine is an element of the 
trustee’s standing rather than an affirmative defense.37 Specifically, a trustee lacks standing to 
sue third parties “when a bankruptcy corporation has joined with [a] third party in defrauding its 
creditors.”38 Like the affirmative defense of in pari delicto, trustees are barred under the 
Wagoner rule “[b]ecause management’s misconduct is imputed to the corporation, and because 
the trustee stands in the shoes of the corporation.”39  
 
B. Application of the Wagoner Rule  
In Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., a chapter 11 trustee lacked standing to assert a 
professional malpractice claim against the Arthur Anderson & Company (“Andersen”) because 
the debtors participated with Andersen in defrauding creditors.40 This bankruptcy proceeding 
arose out of a fraudulent scheme where the debtors would form limited partnership syndications 
so that Andersen could exert greater control over the debtors while generating substantial fees.41  
                                               
35 Id. (citing In re CBI Holding Co., 311 B.R. 350, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). In effect, the sole actor rule is inapplicable 
because “‘the agent[s] and the [principal] are not mere alter egos.’” Id. at 678 (citing Unencumbered Assets, Tr. v. 
Great Am. Ins. Co., 817 F.Supp.2d 1014, 1036 (S.D. Ohio 2011)). 
36 Id. 
37 Wagoner, 944 B.R. at 118. 
38 Id. 
39 Wright v. BankAmerica Corp., 219 F.3d 79, 86-87 (2d Cir. 2000). 
40 Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1095 (2d Cir. 1995). 
41 Id. at 1089. 
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Analyzing the trustee’s complaint, the Second Circuit found that the trustee did not 
meaningfully allege “domination and control of the [d]ebtors by Andersen” because the debtor 
collaborated with Andersen in promulgating the Ponzi scheme.42 Instead, the complaint 
described the debtors as “Ponzi Participants” because of their willingness to work with Andersen 
to revise financial forecasts which “primarily carried forward” the Ponzi schemes.43 
Furthermore, the debtors were not “entirely subordinate” because they were general partners of 
various limited partnerships used to perpetuate a system that they knew was unable to generate 
adequate income to meet their commitments to investors.44 Consequently, the trustee did not 
meaningfully allege that Andersen dominated the debtors, and thus lacked standing under to 




C. The Adverse Interest, Sole Actor, and Insider Exceptions to the Wagoner Rule  
Similar to the affirmative defense of in pari delicto, the Wagoner rule is also subject to 
the adverse interest exception.46 As such, the Second Circuit has found that this exception is also 
subject to the sole actor rule.47  
                                               




46 Wight v. BankAmerica Corp., 219 F.3d at 87 (concluding that a complaint which alleged that a bank was totally 
dominated by corrupt management was sufficient to trigger the adverse interest exception). 
47 In re Mediators, Inc., 105 F.3d 822, 827 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that a sole shareholder, with total decision 
making power on behalf of the corporation, precluded application of the adverse interest exception).  
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Several district courts have held that the “innocent decision-maker” rule is a stand-alone 
exception to the Wagoner rule.48 This is distinct from the Sixth Circuit’s formulation because 
even where the “adverse interest” exception is inapplicable, a trustee’s claim may still be barred 
if the innocent decision-maker exception is established.49 Within this formulation, the Wagoner 
rule does not apply where someone in the debtor’s management could and would have taken 
steps to end ongoing fraudulent conduct if he or she were aware of it.50 Therefore, a trustee’s 
claim may only be valid where a complaint “identif[ies] such person(s), and explain[s] how he 
could and would have brought the fraud to an end.”51  
The debtor’s management at issue in this context are its “non-statutory insiders.”52 “Non-
statutory insiders” include a debtor’s directors, officers, and managers.53 To be considered an 
insider, it is enough that one plausibly fulfills the role of one or more of these groups rather than 
hold a formal title.54 In order to determine whether a person fulfills the role of an insider, courts 
utilize a “totality of the circumstances” test on an individualized basis.55 This test weighs the 
following factors: “(1) the close relationship between the debtor and the third party; (2) the 
degree of the individual's involvement in the debtor's affairs; (3) whether the defendant had 
opportunities to self-deal; and (4) whether the defendant holds or held a controlling interest in 
the debtor corporation.”56  Additionally, an insider must exert “actual management” over the 
                                               
48 See Breeden v. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, LLP, 268 B.R. 704, 706 (S.D.N.Y.2001); See In re Adelphia Commc'ns 
Corp., 330 B.R. 364, 379 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); See In re Sharp Int'l Corp., 278 B.R. 28, 36 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
2002). 
49 In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 330 B.R. at 379. 
50 Wechsler v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent & Sheinfeld, L.L.P., 212 B.R. 34, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
51 Id. 
52 In re TS Employment, Inc., 603 B.R. 700, 703 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 710. 
55 In re Borders Grp., Inc., 453 B.R. 459, 469 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
56 In re PHS Grp. Inc., 581 B.R. 16, 33 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2018) (internal citations omitted). 
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debtor such that the individual has control over “the debtor’s personnel or contract decisions, 
production schedules or accounts payable.”57  
For example, in In re TS Employment, Inc., the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of New York held that a Chapter 11 trustee plausibly alleged that the 
defendant-accountants were insiders of a debtor.58 In its complaint, the trustee sufficiently 
alleged that the accountants plausibly filled the roll of a CFO or Treasurer because they had 
“decision making authority over the [d]ebtor concerning financial matters.”59 Specifically, the 
second factor of the totality of the circumstances test was satisfied because the accountants 
exerted exclusive control over the debtor’s financial reporting systems and internal accounting 
functions.60 Furthermore, the accountants were found to exercise “actual management” because 
they filed quarterly payroll tax returns for the debtor.61 Therefore, the court held that the trustee 
had standing to assert its claim and was not barred by the Wagoner rule.62  
 
Conclusion  
 Although the in pari delicto defense and the Wagoner rule are tools defendants may use 
to escape a trustee’s claim on behalf of the debtor’s estate, they are not death knells of a 
proceeding. Rather, the trustee may use the adverse interest exception in every jurisdiction so 
long as there is sufficient factual basis to assert that the defendant acted to the detriment of a 
debtor it did not have sole control over. On the other hand, while a debtor may have committed 
                                               
57 In re Chas P. Young Co., 145 B.R. 131, 137 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
58 In re TS Employment, Inc., 603 B.R. at 710. 
59 Id. at 709. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 710. 
62 Id. at 711. 
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illegal or fraudulent conduct with the defendant, claims which arise separate and distinct from 
such conduct may foreclose a defendant’s ability to utilize either doctrine.  
 
 
